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INTRODUCTION
On May 10, 2005, in connection with his own criminal
investigation and arrest, Shon Lindstrom provided the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) with information regarding an
online child pornography exchange in which he had participated.1
Lindstrom informed police that a man by the name of Jerry
Banks had electronically shared with Lindstrom pornographic
videos depicting Banks’s sexual abuse of his two-year-old
grandson.2 The FBI’s subsequent investigation revealed that
Banks was the moderator and host of an online chat room called
“Kid Sex and Incest,” where “numerous” child pornography files
were available for download.3 On May 21, 2005, a search
warrant was executed upon Banks’s computer and electronic
storage devices.4 Among these devices, the FBI found material
constituting child pornography, including a video portraying
Banks’s masturbation of his grandson, as had been described by
Lindstrom.5 Banks, who had already served time in prison for
sexually abusing his own son, was arrested and charged with the
possession, production, transportation, and receipt of images of
child pornography.6

†
Senior Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., 2012, St. John’s
University School of Law; Dual B.A., cum laude, Latin and Psychology, 2004, Boston
University. I am grateful to Professors Robert Ruescher and Marc DeGirolami for
their unending advice and guidance throughout the writing process. A very special
thank you to my husband, John Kelly, for his tireless support, advice, and love.
1
United States v. Banks, No. CR. 06-051-S-BLW-WBS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
82368, at *1–2 (D. Idaho Oct. 27, 2006).
2
Id.
3
Id. at *2–3.
4
Id. at *3.
5
United States v. Banks, 556 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2009).
6
Id. at 971; id. at 982 (Alarcón, C.J., concurring); see 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2006 &
Supp. II 2008).
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At his bench trial, the defendant’s wife, Kathryn Banks,
testified as to incriminating comments her husband made to her
prior to his arrest regarding the video.7 Banks was convicted at
the trial level and later appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, arguing that under the federal common law
doctrine of spousal privilege, the district court had erred by not
allowing him to invoke the spousal communications privilege in
order to preclude his wife’s testimony.8 The Ninth Circuit
agreed, rejecting the district court’s somewhat progressive
application of the spousal privilege.9 Specifically, the Ninth
Circuit disagreed with the district court’s extension of an existing
exception to the spousal privilege—namely, the spousal crime
exception, which rendered the privilege inapplicable when the
defendant was charged with committing crimes against his or her
spouse—to also encompass cases where, as in the instant case,
the defendant was charged with crimes against his or her
grandchild.10 Rather, the Ninth Circuit held that the scope of the
exception was limited to instances in which a defendant was
charged with crimes against a child or the “functional equivalent”
of a child of one or both of the spouses and further stated that
Banks’s grandson did not qualify as the “functional equivalent” of
his or his wife’s child.11
Through its holding in Banks, the Ninth Circuit effectively
decided that the spousal communications privilege, an
evidentiary
canon
aimed
at
protecting
confidential
communications between spouses,12 should prevail even where a
defendant is accused of a devastating and morally reprehensible
crime—but only if the victim was not the “functional equivalent”

7
Id. at 971 (majority opinion) (stating that Mrs. Banks testified that the
defendant had made statements to her wherein he admitted to creating the video in
order to assure her that “nothing went on in changing the diaper because of past
things”).
8
Id. at 974.
9
Id. at 975–78.
10
Id. at 976.
11
Id. at 974–78. The court explained that relationships that would be
considered the “functional equivalent” of a parent-child relationship would carry
“indicia of guardianship and responsibility.” Id. at 976. It went on to note other
factors relevant to such a determination, including whether there was a consistency
of care greater than “[i]nfrequent overnight visits” and whether the child-victim
lived on a full time basis with the defendant at the time of the alleged incidents. Id.
12
See infra Part I.B.
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of his or his spouse’s child.13 Other federal courts, including the
Eighth Circuit in United States v. Allery14 and the Tenth Circuit
in United States v. Bahe,15 had previously considered the
applicability of the spousal communications privilege or its
counterpart, the adverse testimonial privilege, in cases where the
defendant was accused of sexual crimes against a minor. While
both the Eighth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit considered general
policy goals in their decisions, each court limited its analysis to
address only circumstances involving allegations with a child or
minor as alleged victim.16 All three circuits, therefore, in
focusing on the status of the alleged victim, failed to adequately
consider the particularly heinous nature of the types of crimes
alleged in the three cases—attempted rape,17 sexual abuse,18 and
the production and distribution of child pornography.19
Both the spousal communications privilege and the adverse
testimonial privilege are rooted in ancient evidentiary principles
favoring the promotion of marital intimacy and privacy.20 Over
time, federal courts began recognizing an exception to these
privileges—known as the “spousal crime” exception, involving
crimes committed by one spouse against the other—in the
interests of justice and fairness.21 As seen in Banks, Allery, and
Bahe, courts have contemplated, and disagreed about, whether
this exception should extend to sexually abusive crimes
committed against minors.22 This Note argues that federal
courts, in considering the applicability of either the spousal
communications privilege or the adverse testimonial privilege,23
should look to the type of crime alleged against the defendant and
should carve out an exception rendering these privileges

13

Banks, 556 F.3d at 976.
United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362, 1367 (8th Cir. 1975).
15
United States v. Bahe, 128 F.3d 1440, 1446 (10th Cir. 1997).
16
See Bahe, 128 F.3d at 1446; Allery, 526 F.2d at 1366–67.
17
Allery, 526 F.2d at 1363 (stating that the defendant was charged with
attempting to rape his twelve-year-old daughter).
18
Bahe, 128 F.3d at 1441 (stating that the defendant was charged with sexual
abuse for allegedly penetrating his eleven-year-old female relative’s vagina with his
hand and finger).
19
United States v. Banks, 556 F.3d 967, 970–71 (9th Cir. 2009).
20
See infra Part I.
21
Allery, 526 F.2d at 1365.
22
See Banks, 556 F.3d at 974; Bahe, 128 F.3d at 1441; Allery, 526 F.2d at 1365.
23
Two separate spousal privileges exist: the spousal communications privilege
and the adverse testimonial privilege. See infra Part I.
14
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unavailable wherever the defendant has been charged with a sex
crime,24 regardless of the victim’s age or relationship to the
defendant. This Note discusses and explains the uniquely
heinous nature of such crimes, their markedly devastating effects
on victims, and the inherent challenges and difficulties in
successful prosecution, in order to emphasize the importance of
allowing them special evidentiary consideration.
Part I discusses the history of spousal privileges, the two
types of spousal privileges, and the justifications most often cited
in support of their continued application. Part II reviews the
evolution of the spousal crime exception and how different
federal courts have broadened or expanded the scope of the
exception in the context of cases involving crimes allegedly
committed against a child victim. Part III discusses Federal
Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415—landmark changes to
federal evidentiary law reflecting Congress’s special concern for
admitting certain probative evidence in sexual assault and child
molestation cases. Lastly, Part IV argues that, in light of the
unique characteristics of sex crimes—namely, their particularly
reprehensible nature, their lasting effects upon both victims and
society at large, the inherent difficulties in prosecuting them, and
the pressing need to successfully and correctly convict sex
offenders—which set them apart from other crimes, the
traditional justifications behind spousal privileges fail to support
their continued application to cases involving alleged sex crimes.

24

For the purposes of this Note, the term “sex crime” encompasses crimes
prosecuted under the following federal statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006 & Supp. I
2007) (entitled “Aggravated sexual abuse”); 18 U.S.C. § 2242 (2006 & Supp. I 2007)
(entitled “Sexual abuse”); 18 U.S.C. § 2243 (2006 & Supp. I 2007) (entitled “Sexual
abuse of a minor or ward”); 18 U.S.C. § 2244 (2006 & Supp. I 2007) (entitled
“Abusive sexual contact”); and any other federal offense, including offenses relating
to the production, distribution, receiving, or possession with intent to distribute of
obscene material involving minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct, where it is
alleged that the defendant, in furtherance of the offense, committed acts which
would tend to satisfy the elements of one of the above listed crimes at a prima facie
level, regardless of whether the defendant was formally charged with any of the
above listed crimes. For example, the author’s definition of “sex crime” would apply
in the Banks case, because the defendant was accused of committing acts against his
grandson which would constitute at least a prima facie case under section 2243 of
the United States Code.
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HISTORY OF SPOUSAL PRIVILEGES

The very existence of privileges in the realm of evidentiary
law signifies a weighty societal importance bestowed upon
certain relationships, as such privileges often operate to exclude
accurate, reliable, and extremely probative evidence that is often
otherwise unattainable.25 In particular, privileges emphasize
and encourage free disclosure and the protection of privacy and
trust in certain revered personal and professional relationships.26
Examples of these traditionally revered relationships include
attorney-client, clergy-penitent, psychotherapist-patient, and,
significantly, husband-wife.27 Dating back centuries, spousal
privileges have long functioned to protect the marital
relationship and promote familial harmony.28
Another unique attribute of privileges, at least in the realm
of evidentiary rules, is that they are guided by federal common
law.29 In 1958, the drafting process of the Federal Rules of
Evidence began with the goal of codifying and clarifying the
common law rules, which had dominated the federal courts for
centuries.30 The judiciary committee that drafted the rules
struggled to overcome internal conflict and reach agreement over
how to draft rules governing evidentiary privileges.31 Ultimately,
the judiciary committee recommended through Draft Article V
that many traditionally recognized privileges be eliminated.32
Congress, however, reacted vehemently to the committee’s
suggestions in Draft Article V, and a “fruitless” two-year debate
ensued.33 The “hot potato” of privilege doctrine proved both
“controversial” and “emotionally provocative,”34 and eventually
Congress decided that Federal Rule of Evidence 501 would
25

Emily C. Aldridge, Note, To Catch a Predator or To Save His Marriage:
Advocating for an Expansive Child Abuse Exception to the Marital Privileges in
Federal Courts, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1761, 1767 (2010).
26
Id.
27
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 43–52 (1980).
28
See infra Part I.C.
29
Aldridge, supra note 25, at 1765.
30
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Draft Article V of the Federal Rules of Evidence on
Privileges, One of the Most Influential Pieces of Legislation Never Enacted: The
Strength of the Ingroup Loyalty of the Federal Judiciary, 58 ALA. L. REV. 41, 4445
(2006).
31
Id. at 4647.
32
Id. at 47.
33
Id. at 47–48; Aldridge, supra note 25, at 1770.
34
Imwinkelried, supra note 30, at 48, 50.
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replace any precise rules governing evidentiary privileges.35 As a
result, Federal Rule of Evidence 501 is the only rule covering
evidentiary privileges and functions to give the power to the
federal courts themselves to expand, limit, shape, and change the
law of privileges as they see fit “in light of reason and
experience.”36
This power—that is, the power to shape privileges as time
goes on and societal norms change—necessarily indicates that
the Legislature intended this area of evidentiary law to be
dynamic. This Note argues that “reason and experience” have
shown that sex crimes, with their uniquely reprehensible nature,
traumatic effect on their victims, serious risks to society, and
difficulties in prosecution warrant their own exception to the
traditionally-recognized spousal privileges in federal courts. In
order to familiarize the reader with spousal privileges, how they
work, and the justifications behind their current application in
federal courts, Parts I.A and I.B will explain the two types of
spousal privileges and how they differ. Part I.C will then discuss
the two principally-cited justifications for the continued
application of spousal privileges in federal courts.
A.

Adverse Testimonial Privilege

The adverse testimonial privilege37 prevents a witness from
being compelled to testify against his or her spouse.38 A “vestige
of a long-abandoned common law rule,”39 the privilege dates back
35

Aldridge, supra note 25, at 1770–71.
FED. R. EVID. 501 (“The common law—as interpreted by United States courts
in the light of reason and experience—governs a claim of privilege unless any of the
following provides otherwise: the United States Constitution; a federal statute; or
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.”).
37
The adverse testimonial privilege has also been called the “testimonial
privilege,” the “marital testimonial privilege,” the “spousal testimonial privilege” or
the “ ‘marital or spousal ‘disqualification’ privilege.” Mark Glover, Evidentiary
Privileges for Cohabiting Parents: Protecting Children Inside and Outside of
Marriage, 70 La. L. Rev. 751, 761 (2010); R. Michael Cassidy, Reconsidering Spousal
Privileges After Crawford, 33 Am. J. Crim. L. 339, 356 (2006); Aldridge, supra note
25, at 1765. In other contexts, it has also been called the “ ‘anti-marital facts’
privilege.” United States v. White, 974 F.2d 1135, 1137 (9th Cir. 1992). For the
purposes of this Note, the privilege will be referred to as the “adverse testimonial
privilege.”
38
Amanda H. Frost, Updating the Marital Privileges: A Witness-Centered
Rationale, 14 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 12 (1999).
39
Cassidy, supra note 37; see also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 43–44
(1980); Glover, supra note 37, at 762.
36
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to the seventeenth century and the doctrine of spousal
incompetency,40 which dictated that, because a woman was her
husband’s property, allowing her testimony against her spouse
would effectively amount to forced self-incrimination.41 Running
concurrently with that doctrine was the canon that a party may
not testify on his own behalf given his interest in the outcome of
the proceedings.42 Although the Supreme Court abrogated the
doctrine of spousal incompetency in 1933 through its holding in
Funk v. United States,43 the Court preserved the adverse
testimonial privilege itself.44 Later, in Hawkins v. United States,
the Supreme Court explicitly stated that the adverse testimonial
privilege operates to preserve the marital relationship.45
Approximately twenty years later, in Trammel v. United States,
the Court retreated somewhat from its earlier views and
significantly changed the scope of the privilege by limiting the
ability to invoke its protection to the witness-spouse only,
effectively eliminating a defendant-spouse’s right to singlehandedly bar testimony of his or her spouse.46 In doing so, the
Court reasoned that, where a witness-spouse is willing to testify
in a criminal proceeding against his or her spouse, the marriage
is likely in “disrepair” and the rationale behind the spousal
privilege would not be furthered by allowing a defendant-spouse
to bar such testimony.47
In order for the adverse testimonial privilege to apply, three
requirements must be met: (1) the proceedings for which the
privilege is sought to be invoked must be of a criminal nature;
(2) the couple must be legally married at the time of trial; and
(3) the invoking party may only invoke the privilege with respect

40

Aldridge, supra note 25, at 1772.
Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44; Glover, supra note 37, at 762.
42
Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44; Cassidy, supra note 37.
43
290 U.S. 371, 381 (1933).
44
Id. at 386–87 (overturning prior cases which held that a wife was excluded
from testifying for her husband due to her interest in the event, without regard to
the type of testimony she might give).
45
358 U.S. 74, 77–79 (1958) (explaining that “[a]dverse testimony given in
criminal proceedings would, we think, be likely to destroy almost any marriage”).
46
Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53.
47
Id. at 52 (“When one spouse is willing to testify against the other in a
criminal proceeding—whatever the motivation—their relationship is almost
certainly in disrepair; there is probably little in the way of marital harmony for the
privilege to preserve.”).
41
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to testimony tending to incriminate the defendant-spouse.48 The
testimonial privilege thus specifically operates to preserve
marriages currently in existence at the time of trial, without
regard to whether the defendant and his or her spouse were
legally married at the time of the event in question.49
Much criticism has been leveled at the adverse testimonial
privilege over the years.50 Courts and scholars have long
denounced the idea that wives are their husbands’ chattel and
similarly have rejected the ancient doctrine that assumes only
one shared, unitary identity between spouses.51 The Supreme
Court’s holding in Trammel belies its own discomfort with the
prospect of preserving a marriage at the expense of justice in
cases where the witness-spouse is willing to actively assist in the
defendant-spouse’s conviction.
In the struggle to balance
competing interests in justice and preserving marriage through
the adverse testimonial privilege’s continued application, some
courts have even taken it upon themselves to impose a judicial
review of a marriage’s viability, attempting to reach a judicial
determination regarding whether a marriage is stable enough to
warrant legal protection where the defendant-spouse and the
witness-spouse are separated at the time of trial.52
B.

Spousal Communications Privilege

The spousal communications privilege53 may be one of the
oldest testimonial privileges in English common law.54 Its
function has long been to bar disclosure of information obtained
through private communications between the spouses, and
generally may be invoked by either the witness-spouse or the

48

Frost, supra note 38.
Developments in the Law—Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1450, 1567 (1985) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
50
Frost, supra note 38, at 13 (“The adverse testimony privilege has been under
continuous attack . . . .”).
51
Aldridge, supra note 25, at 1775.
52
Developments in the Law, supra note 49, at 1566; Frost, supra note 38, at 14.
53
The privilege has also been called the “marital communications privilege” or
“confidential communications privilege.” See Developments in the Law, supra note
49, at 1564–65. For the purposes of this Note, the privilege will be referred to as the
“spousal communications privilege.”
54
Cassidy, supra note 37, at 357. But see 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2227 (McNaughton ed., 1961); Developments in the
Law, supra note 49, at 1565; Frost, supra note 38, at 8.
49
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defendant-spouse in federal courts.55 The sanctity of marital
trust and intimacy traditionally has been deemed so “essential”
to preserving marriage as to outweigh the justice system’s
interests in using evidence barred by the privilege to secure
criminal convictions.56 The spousal communications privilege
therefore operates to guard marital intimacy and privacy, in that
it protects all confidential communications made between
spouses during the course of their marriage without regard to
whether that marriage remains intact at the time of trial.57
In order for the spousal communications privilege to be
applicable, three prerequisites must be met.58 First, there must
have been a communication between the spouses.59 These
communications generally involve written and verbal expressions
made with a “subjective intent to transmit information.”60 The
second requirement is that the communication was intended to
be kept confidential.61 While there is a general presumption that
spousal communications are confidential, this presumption may
be rebutted either by showing that the spouses knew that a third
party was present for the communication or that, regardless of
the circumstances under which the communication was actually
made, the communicating spouse intended the statements to be
disclosed to others.62 Lastly, the defendant-spouse and the
witness-spouse must have been legally married at the time the
communication was made.63
The spousal communications privilege differs from the
adverse testimonial privilege in a few ways. While the adverse
testimonial privilege is held by the witness-spouse, in that he or
she has the ability to choose whether to testify against the

55

Aldridge, supra note 25, at 1776–77.
Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934) (stating that “[t]he basis of the
immunity given to communications between husband and wife is the protection of
marital confidences, regarded as so essential to the preservation of the marriage
relationship as to outweigh the disadvantages to the administration of justice which
the privilege entails”); see also Cassidy, supra note 37, at 358.
57
Aldridge, supra note 25, at 1777–78.
58
Cassidy, supra note 37, at 357.
59
Id.
60
Developments in the Law, supra note 49, at 1572; see also Cassidy, supra note
37, at 357 (describing communications as “words or utterances intended to convey a
message”).
61
Cassidy, supra note 37, at 357–58.
62
Glover, supra note 37, at 765.
63
Cassidy, supra note 37, at 357.
56
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defendant-spouse, the spousal communications privilege may be
invoked by either the witness-spouse or the defendant-spouse—
thus allowing a defendant-spouse to bar his or her spouse from
testifying, regardless of the witness-spouse’s desire to testify.64
Furthermore, unlike the adverse testimonial privilege, the
spousal communications privilege applies in both criminal and
civil proceedings.65 Lastly, while the applicability of the adverse
testimonial privilege hinges on whether the spouses are still
legally married at the time of trial, the applicability of the
spousal communications privilege is contingent only on whether
the defendant-spouse and the witness-spouse were legally
married at the time the communications in question occurred.66
The spousal communications privilege generally has received
less scrutiny than its sister privilege.67 Commentators, however,
have noted that the application of the confidential
communications privilege can be complicated because marriages
do not consist wholly of oral and written communications.68 For
example, it may be difficult to determine whether nonverbal
signals and gestures—typically well understood between
spouses—technically constitute “communications,” despite the
fact that the purported justifications behind the privilege would
seem to render these nonverbal signals just as subject to
protection as their verbal counterparts.69 Additionally, as seen in
Banks, communications between spouses may be particularly
probative and compelling, and the inadmissibility of such
communications at trial arguably represents a more significant
impediment to the administration of justice than even the
adverse testimonial privilege.

64

Id. at 356–58.
Aldridge, supra note 25, at 1776.
66
Id. at 177778.
67
Ryan v. Comm’r, 568 F.2d 531, 544 n.6 (7th Cir. 1977) (discussing how the
spousal communications privilege has avoided the “intense criticism” that has
accompanied the adverse testimonial privilege); see also Milton C. Regan, Jr.,
Spousal Privilege and the Meanings of Marriage, 81 VA. L. REV. 2045, 2056–57
(1995).
68
Frost, supra note 38, at 1112.
69
Id.; see United States v. Bahe, 128 F.3d 1440, 1441 (10th Cir. 1997)
(describing how the defendant often inserted his finger into his wife’s vagina while
she was asleep, bent his finger into a “hook,” and pulled it out forcefully in order to
signal to her that he wanted to have sex—a maneuver he also allegedly performed
on an eleven-year-old female relative he was accused of sexually abusing).
65
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Justifications for Spousal Privileges

While spousal privileges traditionally have been supported
on a variety of different policy grounds, there are two main
justifications that commentators cite as rationale for their
continued application.70
The utilitarian rationale, first
promulgated by Professor Wigmore through a four-factor
balancing test, has been applied to virtually all modern federal
privileges71 and is frequently invoked by courts in balancing the
costs and benefits to applying and/or extending evidentiary
privileges.72 The other primary rationale among commentators
and courts is the protection of marital and familial privacy, often
called the “humanistic rationale.”73 Each of these justifications is
discussed in turn below in Parts II.C.i and II.C.ii.
In addition to these widely accepted justifications, other
theories have been suggested to support the legacy of spousal
privileges.
The “image theory,” although “never explicitly
invoked by courts,” justifies the privilege as protecting the public
perception or “image” of the legal system.74 This theory posits
that the general public would find it repulsive for the legal
70

See, e.g., Cassidy, supra note 37, at 358 (stating that the primary
justifications for spousal privileges are utilitarian and humanistic); Developments in
the Law, supra note 49, at 1577 (stating that marital privileges are mainly
supported on utilitarian grounds); Frost, supra note 38, at 15 (calling the utilitarian
rationale the “most frequently cited justification” for at least the testimonial
privileges).
71
Imwinkelried, supra note 30, at 63 (stating that both draft Article V and
modern federal privilege law are supported primarily by Wigmore’s utilitarian
analysis); see also Pamela A. Haun, The Marital Privilege in the Twenty-First
Century, 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 137, 141 (2001) (discussing how Wigmore’s analysis
“should lie at the foundation of every rule of privileged communications”).
72
For courts that have considered Professor Wigmore’s analysis or a variation
thereof, see Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10–15 (1996) (adopting a similar test);
ACLU v. Finch, 638 F.2d 1336, 1344 (5th Cir. Unit A. Mar. 1981), aff’d sub nom,
ACLU v. Mississippi, 911 F.2d 1066, 1068–69 (5th Cir. 1990); and Garner v.
Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1100–01 (5th Cir. 1970) (applying analysis to attorneyclient privileges).
73
See Cassidy, supra note 37, at 36061; Developments in the Law, supra note
49, at 158385.
74
See Developments in the Law, supra note 49, at 1585 (stating that compelling
an unwilling spouse to testify would place the legal system in a no-win situation, in
that regardless of whether the witness was truthful or dishonest, the public could
deem the forced testimony unfair); see also, e.g., A & M v. Doe, 61 A.D.2d 426, 433,
403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 380 (4th Dep’t 1978) (holding that compelling adverse spousal
testimony could “undermine” public trust in the legal system as a whole); Frost,
supra note 38, at 20 (discussing how the image theory protects the reputation of the
legal system by keeping out potentially unreliable testimony).
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system to compel a person to testify against, and assist in the
conviction of, his or her spouse in a criminal proceeding.75 This
argument, however, fails to acknowledge the—presumably—
equally upsetting result of allowing a true criminal to avoid
punishment and denying a true victim retribution. The image
theory further contends that the possible result of perjury where
the law compels adverse spousal testimony may similarly serve
to weaken the public’s faith in the justice system.76 Again,
however, this position does not give due deference to the
protections the justice system has in place for preventing perjury
in the many circumstances where a witness may be reluctant to
testify truthfully. Because the possibility for perjury always
exists—albeit in varying measures, depending on a multitude of
factors—faith in the accuracy and legitimacy of the adversary
system necessarily must depend on public trust in protections
such as the oath taken by each witness, the process of crossexamination, and an impartial jury’s role as fact-finder to stave
off the inherent risk of false testimony.77
Another secondary theory, the preservation of marriage
theory, similarly has been offered as a justification for the
continued application of spousal privileges.78 This theory posits
that the preservation of domestic harmony is an important
societal goal which sets marital privileges apart from
professional privileges generally.79 This theory, however, tends
to fold into the utilitarian analysis, as the weight of such a
societal goal must ultimately be judged against the competing
societal goal of administering justice. This Note therefore does
not address these two ancillary and less prevalent justifications,
and instead focuses on the oft-cited utilitarian and humanistic
theories of spousal privileges.80

75

Frost, supra note 38, at 20.
Id.
77
See id. at 21 (stating that the system is well-equipped to deal with biased
witnesses and possesses the ability to charge those unwilling to testify with
contempt of court).
78
Aldridge, supra note 25, at 1780–81; see also Frost, supra note 38, at 21–22.
79
Frost, supra note 38, at 21–22.
80
See infra Part I.C.12.
76
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The Utilitarian Analysis and Professor Wigmore’s Test

The utilitarian rationale focuses on a social cost-benefit
analysis wherever an evidentiary privilege functions to exclude
probative evidence.81 Professor Wigmore set forth a four-factor
test involving four separate considerations for courts to use in
deciding whether the social benefit of recognizing an evidentiary
privilege tends to outweigh any resultant harm from the loss of
the privileged evidence at trial.82 The utilitarian test allows an
invoking court, in evaluating the applicability of a privilege, to
determine whether the relationship at stake should ultimately be
valued above the truth-finding function of the court.83 The
utilitarian analysis generally differs from the “humanistic”
approach84 in that it weighs systemic costs and benefits, as
opposed to the narrower consideration of the importance of
marital privacy for its own sake.85
According to Professor Wigmore, the following four
conditions must be met in order for a court to grant or recognize
a privilege:
The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed[;]
This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties[;]
The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered[; and]
The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of
the communications must be greater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal of litigation.86

While Professor Wigmore’s test specifically addresses
communications, its basic idea can be and has been applied to a
variety of evidentiary privileges, including the adverse
testimonial privilege, through the fourth factor’s cost-benefit
analysis.87

81

Cassidy, supra note 37, at 358 (stating that the utilitarian rationale justifies
the recognition of a privilege “where the social benefits to be achieved from excusing
the witness exceed the social costs of losing the testimony.”)
82
See WIGMORE, supra note 54, § 2285.
83
Cassidy, supra note 37, at 358.
84
See infra Part I.C.2.
85
See Cassidy, supra note 37, at 358; Frost, supra note 38, at 16.
86
See WIGMORE, supra note 54, § 2285.
87
See Frost, supra note 38, at 15–16.
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The “traditional” utilitarian justification for the adverse
testimonial privilege is that to force one spouse to testify against
the other in a criminal proceeding would destroy the marriage
and may promote perjury, such that the privilege, in allowing the
witness-spouse to decide whether to testify, tends to prevent
disharmony and encourage truthfulness.88 Such a contention, of
course, assumes that such privileges actually do promote the
institution of marriage and that society actually benefits from
promoting marriage.89
Likewise, the utilitarian argument supporting the spousal
communications privilege contends that if such communications
were not shielded from the reach of the court, intimacy in
marriages everywhere would be “chilled.”90
However, two
“[d]ebatable behavioral assumptions” underlie the utilitarian
rationale.91 First, the theory assumes that federal evidentiary
laws, and specifically the spousal communications privilege, are
known and thus have influence over marital behavior.92 Second,
the utilitarian theory assumes that destruction of the privilege
would actually operate to discourage spouses from freely
communicating.93
2.

Marital Privacy

The marital privacy rationale, sometimes deemed the
“humanistic” rationale,94 suggests that it is “fundamentally
indecent” for the legal system to intrude upon the privacy of a
marriage.95 This approach to spousal privileges differs from the
utilitarian approach in that it focuses on the “value of protecting
individual rights” rather than the overall benefits—and costs—to
the public.96
Because marital privacy promotes personal
autonomy and fosters intimacy between partners,97 American
jurisprudence has traditionally given much weight to the
88

Cassidy, supra note 37, at 359.
See Developments in the Law, supra note 49, at 1578.
90
See Cassidy, supra note 37, at 359; Developments in the Law, supra note 49,
at 1577.
91
Developments in the Law, supra note 49, at 1578–79.
92
Id. at 1578.
93
Id. at 1579.
94
Cassidy, supra note 37, at 360.
95
Id.; see Charles L. Black, Jr., The Marital and Physician Privileges—A
Reprint of a Letter to a Congressman, 1975 DUKE L.J. 45, 48.
96
Developments in the Law, supra note 49, at 1583.
97
Frost, supra note 38, at 24.
89
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“[i]nsulat[ion]” of home and family life from outside influence.98
Supporters of the privacy theory have pointed to decisions such
as Griswold v. Connecticut,99 the Supreme Court case stating
that there is a “private realm of family life” impenetrable by the
government, as evidence that a constitutional protection for the
marital relationship not only exists, but also must apply to
communications made within the realm of that relationship.100
Others have viewed the spousal privileges as protecting the
privacy of the marital unit in that they shield it from “the
dilemma of conflicting loyalties” inherent when a spouse is
compelled by the government to testify against his or her
defendant-spouse.101
II. THE SPOUSAL CRIME EXCEPTION AND ITS DEVELOPMENT
Despite the role spousal privileges have historically played
in the federal common law, even early courts recognized that, at
times, the policy supporting such privileges may be outweighed
by overwhelming interests in justice. One example of such an
overwhelming interest exists in the case of a crime committed by
one spouse against the other.102 In such cases, the spousal
privileges would, unless modified, typically function to bar a
witness-spouse’s testimony. Such a situation would result in, for
example, a husband being effectively immune from prosecution
for crimes committed against his wife in the home, where his
wife would be the “only source of eyewitness testimony.”103 In
response to this undesirable phenomenon, federal courts evolved
to recognize a spousal crime exception to the privileges, such that

98

Id.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
100
Developments in the Law, supra note 49, at 1584 (quoting Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)); see also Black, supra note 95.
101
Developments in the Law, supra note 49, at 1584–85.
102
The other example is the joint crime exception. In crimes where both spouses
are participants, some federal courts have abrogated the adverse testimonial
privilege and/or the marital communications privilege. See Frost, supra note 38, at
39. Courts that have adopted the exception have stated that marriages wherein the
spouses conspire to criminal activity are not “socially beneficial” and not worth
preserving. Id.; see Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51–52 (1980); United
States v. Keck, 773 F.2d 759, 767 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Clark, 712 F.2d
299, 300–01 (7th Cir. 1983). As such, the need to ensure the administration of justice
outweighs the public policy of promoting the marriage.
103
Cassidy, supra note 37, at 361; see also Frost, supra note 38, at 41.
99
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the spousal privileges typically will be inapplicable where a
defendant is accused of committing an offense against his or her
spouse.104
In United States v. Allery, the Eighth Circuit became the
first federal court to extend the scope of the spousal crime
exception to also encompass crimes allegedly committed against
the child or children of either spouse. In Allery, the defendant
appealed the district court’s decision to admit his wife’s adverse
testimony regarding his actions on the evening he allegedly
attempted to rape his twelve-year-old daughter.105
In
contemplating the extension of the privilege, the Allery court
noted that “a serious crime against a child is an offense against
th[e] family harmony and to society as well”106 and, as such, the
purposes of the adverse testimonial privilege would not be
furthered by applying the privilege.107 The court went on to note
that in child abuse cases, often the witness-spouse’s testimony is
crucial to conviction, due to a lack of witnesses.108 Additionally,
the Allery court noted that rules impeding “the discovery of
truth” also impede “the doing of justice.”109 The court ultimately
held that the spousal crime exception to the adverse testimonial
privilege should be, and therefore was, extended in Eighth
Circuit courts to apply where the defendant-spouse was charged
with crimes against a child of either spouse.110
Seventeen years later, in United States v. White, the Ninth
Circuit had occasion to consider whether a defendant should be
able to invoke the spousal communications privilege to bar a
spouse’s testimony where the marital communication in question
involved threats to kill the witness-spouse and her daughter.111
104
The offenses committed in this context have been broadly interpreted to
include “any personal wrong done to the other, whether physically, mentally or
morally injurious.” United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362, 1365 (8th Cir. 1975).
105
Id. at 1363.
106
Id. at 1366.
107
Id. at 1367.
108
Id. at 1366.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 1367. The Allery court also considered, in making its decision, the
“strong state court authority” in favor of the premise that a crime against a child of
either spouse is akin to a wrong committed against the other spouse. Id. at 1366.
The court further noted that, at the time the court handed down its ruling, at least
eleven states within the prior fifteen years alone had passed similar laws barring
invocation of the spousal privilege where the defendant was accused of child abuse
or neglect. Id. at 1367.
111
United States v. White, 974 F.2d 1135, 1137 (9th Cir. 1992).
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In White, the defendant was accused of voluntary manslaughter
in connection with the death of his two-year-old stepdaughter,
just a week after telling his wife that he would kill both her and
her child if he were to be left to care for the child again.112 Using
Allery as guidance, the court noted that protecting threats made
against a spouse or a spouse’s children through application of the
spousal communications privilege was inconsistent with the
“long-standing public policy” interests of protecting marital
integrity underlying the application of the privilege.113 By virtue
of this decision, the Ninth Circuit effectively extended the scope
of the spousal crime exception to the spousal communications
privilege to encompass situations where the policy interests
behind the privilege were not furthered by the application of the
privilege.114
Five years after the White decision, the Tenth Circuit in
United States v. Bahe contemplated the application of the spousal
communications privilege where the defendant-spouse was
accused of sexually abusing an eleven-year-old female relative
visiting the home.115 In that case, the court was faced with the
issue of whether the privilege should function to bar the
defendant’s wife from testifying about a specific sexual act the
defendant often used to initiate sex with her.116 In its reasoning,
the court noted that there was “no significant difference, as a
policy matter” between a crime committed against a child of the
married couple, as seen in Allery and White, and a child relative
merely visiting the home.117 The court went on to note that in
light of Federal Rule of Evidence 501 and its charge to federal
courts to modify spousal privileges according to “reason and
experience,” it thought it appropriate to extend the logic of the
spousal crime exception to all spousal testimony regarding abuse
of a minor child within the household.118
Most recently, the Ninth Circuit in Banks rejected the more
expansive views taken by its sister circuits in considering the
spousal crime exception.119 Rather, the Banks court opted to
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119

Id.
Id. at 1138.
Id.
United States v. Bahe, 128 F.3d 1440, 1446 (10th Cir. 1997).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See United States v. Banks, 556 F.3d 967, 974–77 (9th Cir. 2009).
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return to the balancing factors considered in Allery, zeroing in on
an analysis of the purposes underlying the spousal privileges—
that is, promoting marital and family harmony—and the
application of such privileges to offenses committed against the
witness-spouse or the children of one or both of the spouses.120
The Banks court noted that the rationale underlying the
privileges would not be furthered by applying the spousal
communications privilege to cases where the defendant was
charged with crimes against the spouse or either the spouse’s
child or “functional equivalent” and therefore limited its
extension of the spousal crime exception to encompass such cases
involving only children or “the functional equivalent” of
children.121 The court declined, however, to extend this logic any
further, holding that only “comparable familial ties” between
actual and functional children rendered the extension of the
spousal crime exception logical.122
In doing so, the court
implicitly decided that the promotion of marital harmony would
be furthered by, and indeed would justify, limiting the scope of
the spousal crime exception to children and functional children of
the spouses and that other minor children in the household
would not merit the same level of legal protection against sexual
abuse in the face of concerns over promoting marriage.123
III. FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 413–415 AND CONGRESS’S
VIEW
The notion that sex crimes warrant separate evidentiary
consideration is not a new one.124 In 1994, in response to growing
public concern over sex offenders and the apparent inefficiencies
of the criminal justice system in keeping post-release offenders
from reoffending,125 Congress enacted new rules to be added to

120

Id. at 976.
Id. at 974.
122
See id. at 975–76.
123
See id. at 974–77; see also Aldridge, supra note 25, at 1792.
124
See generally FED. R. EVID. 413–415; Sara Sun Beale, Prior Similar Acts in
Prosecutions for Rape and Child Sex Abuse, 4 CRIM. L.F. 307, 313–15 (1993).
125
R. Wade King, Comment, Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414: By
Answering the Public’s Call for Increased Protection from Sexual Predators, Did
Congress Move Too Far Toward Encouraging Conviction Based on Character Rather
than Guilt?, 33 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1167, 1175 (2002).
121
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the existing Federal Rules of Evidence.126 These new rules
addressed a perceived gap in the evidentiary arena—namely,
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)127 and its bar against evidence
regarding the defendant’s prior acts to be introduced at trial.128
A “traditional tenet[] of American evidentiary law,” this
prohibition against admission of character evidence was widely
accepted prior to the adoption of Federal Rules of Evidence 413,
414, and 415.129 Thus, the passage of these rules, which function
to allow into evidence testimony regarding the defendant’s prior
acts in certain sex crime prosecutions, represents a significant
acknowledgement by Congress that sex crimes warrant specific
consideration.
Prior to the adoption of the new rules, Federal Rules of
Evidence 404 and 405 governed the admissibility of character
evidence in all types of federal prosecutions.130 Rule 404(a) states
that character evidence is generally inadmissible as propensity
evidence, except in limited circumstances.131 Rule 404(b) further
states that while evidence of prior crimes or acts, like other
character evidence, is not admissible to show propensity, it is
admissible as to proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident,
subject to particular requirements of pre-trial notice.132 Rule 405,
for its part, states that evidence of “specific instances
of . . . conduct” are admissible where a person’s character is an
“essential element of a charge, claim, or defense” or during cross
examination of a witness’s opinion or reputation testimony.133
Thus, the ability to introduce evidence of prior specific acts or
instances of conduct has long been severely limited in federal
prosecutions.

126
Joyce R. Lombardi, Comment, Because Sex Crimes Are Different: Why
Maryland Should (Carefully) Adopt the Contested Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and
414 that Permit Propensity Evidence of a Criminal Defendant’s Other Sex Offenses,
34 U. BALT. L. REV. 103, 113 (2004).
127
FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
128
King, supra note 125, at 1168.
129
Id.
130
See Michael S. Ellis, Comment, The Politics Behind Federal Rules of
Evidence 413, 414, and 415, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 961, 964–65 (1998).
131
See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
132
Id.
133
Id. at 405.
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Functionally, Federal Rules of Evidence 404 and 405 codify
traditions long established in American common law that aim to
reduce prejudice.134 These traditions were born out of an attempt
to prevent juries from drawing inferences about whether the
defendant “acted in conformity with his character on the
particular occasion when there would be little or no corroborating
evidence.”135
Indeed, while evidence of prior acts may be
exceedingly probative, such evidence also has a remarkable
ability to confuse, surprise, and ultimately arouse prejudice
within a jury.136 Therefore, limiting the admissibility of specific
prior acts or conduct to situations where either the actor’s
character is an essential element of a claim, or where the
evidence is promulgated for certain enumerated purposes,137
drastically limits the effect of this potentially prejudicial
evidence.138 The disadvantage of such a limitation, of course, is
the exclusion of evidence that may be of the utmost relevance
and probative value.139
Given these restrictions and their role as “one of the oldest
fixtures in American Evidence law,”140 Federal Rules of Evidence
413, 414, and 415 did not come without a fair amount of
controversy.141 Proposed and supported by United States Senator
Robert Dole and Representative Susan Molinari, these Rules
essentially codify a ninth exception to Rule 404(b) by allowing
evidence of a defendant’s prior sexual misconduct and sex
offenses to be admitted at trial for the specific purpose of showing
that defendant’s propensity to commit that type of crime.142
Specifically, Rules 413, 414, and 415 apply in criminal
134

Ellis, supra note 130, at 966.
Id.; see also King, supra note 125, at 1170.
136
See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Undertaking the Task of Reforming the
American Character Evidence Prohibition: The Importance of Getting the Experiment
Off on the Right Foot, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 285, 290–292 (1994) [hereinafter
Undertaking]; Ellis, supra note 130, at 967; King, supra note 125, at 1170–71.
137
FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
138
Ellis, supra note 130, at 967–68.
139
See Beale, supra note 124, at 307–08.
140
Undertaking, supra note 136, at 285.
141
Christina E. Wells & Erin Elliott Motley, Reinforcing the Myth of the Crazed
Rapist: A Feminist Critique of Recent Rape Legislation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 127, 141
(2001); see also 140 CONG. REC. H5439 (daily ed. June 29, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Schumer); 139 CONG. REC. S15138 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1993) (statement of Sen. Dole);
King, supra note 125, at 1178–81 (discussing Congress’s “[u]northodox” adoption of
Rules 413 and 414).
142
Lombardi, supra note 126, at 113–14.
135
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prosecutions of sexual assault;143 criminal prosecutions of child
sex abuse;144 and civil prosecutions alleging sexual assault or
child molestation,145 respectively.
In adopting these Rules, Congress looked to the uniqueness
of sex crime cases as justification for “special standards and
special treatment”—indeed, an altogether different evidentiary
standard.146 Noting that both child-victim and adult-victim sex
crime prosecutions have “distinctive characteristics” which make
conviction inherently more difficult given traditional evidentiary
maxims, Congress ultimately decided that both types of
prosecutions needed a carve-out.147
In making this
determination, Congress identified recurring issues in these
prosecutions, such as credibility problems,148 unusual and specific
dispositions of defendants toward sexual violence,149 the tendency
of victims in both rape and child molestation cases to be too
traumatized or intimidated to come forward,150 and the inherent
he-said-she-said credibility wars.151 Indeed, notwithstanding the
controversy surrounding the passage of these Rules,152 it is
significant that Congress felt strongly enough about these unique
attributes of sex crime prosecutions to pass new evidentiary rules
specifically tailored to such prosecutions.

143
FED. R. EVID. 413 (entitled “Evidence of Similar Crimes in Sexual-Assault
Cases”).
144
FED. R. EVID. 414 (entitled “Evidence of Similar Crimes in Child-Molestation
Cases”).
145
FED. R. EVID. 415 (entitled “Evidence of Similar Acts in Civil Cases Involving
Sexual Assault or Child Molestation”).
146
See 139 CONG. REC. S15138 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1993) (statement of Sen. Dole).
147
140 Cong. Rec. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994).
148
See id.
149
See id.
150
See 140 CONG. REC. H5440 (daily ed. June, 29 1994).
151
See 140 CONG. REC. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994); see also Beale, supra
note 124, at 316–17 (discussing the “structural difficulty of proving sexual offenses”
under the evidentiary rules in existence prior to the passage of Federal Rules of
Evidence 413–15).
152
See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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IV. WHY THE FEDERAL COURTS SHOULD ADOPT AN EXCEPTION TO
THE SPOUSAL PRIVILEGES WHERE A DEFENDANT IS ACCUSED OF A
SEX CRIME
Despite their well-established roots in federal evidentiary
law, spousal privileges have undergone changes over the past few
decades.
Recently, federal courts have taken varying
perspectives on whether, and how far, to expand the application
of the spousal crime exception to also apply to crimes against
children. In contemplating such an expansion, federal courts
have looked to general policy interests and to rationales
traditionally supporting the spousal privileges as guidance. Part
IV of this Note explains how “reason and experience”—the tools
with which Federal Rule of Evidence 501 has armed the federal
courts to shape and shift the boundaries of evidentiary
privileges—have evolved to show that sex crime prosecutions,
regardless of the victim’s age or relationship to the defendant,
warrant their own exception to federal spousal privileges. Part A
explains why sex crimes are particularly heinous and uniquely
reprehensible relative to other crimes of violence. Part B
discusses the ways in which sex crimes affect society at large, the
problems inherent in prosecuting these crimes, and why the
public has a particular interest in the successful and accurate
resolution of such prosecutions.
Part C shows that the
justifications underlying the continued use of spousal privileges
in federal courts cannot support their application in sex crime
prosecutions in light of competing policy concerns.
A.

The Inherently Heinous Nature of Sex Crimes and the
Damage to the Victim

As one scholar noted, “[f]ew types of crime command the
same public attention and evoke the same level of outrage as
sexual offenses.”153 Indeed, sexual assaults tend to be more
psychologically damaging to their victims than other crimes.154
In America, the general public has come to view rape as “the

153
Jeffrey C. Sandler et al., Does a Watched Pot Boil? A Time-Series Analysis of
New York State’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification Law, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 284, 284 (2008).
154
Roxanne Lieb et al., Sexual Predators and Social Policy, 23 CRIME & JUST.:
REV. RES. 43, 49 (1998).

FINAL_KELLY

660

3/4/2013 11:46 AM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:637

most heinous crime,” deserving of severe punishment.155 Sexual
offenses by their very nature are “personally invasive” in a
manner fundamentally different from other violent crimes, in
that they undermine their victims’ reproductive strategies and
choices.156 Whether the victim is a child or an adult, the
tremendous and arguably unparalleled psychological effects of
sex crimes are compelling in their severe and enduring nature.157
Rape has been described as “one of the most brutal, invasive
and degrading” crimes, resulting in “intense trauma” and
“profound and lasting injury” to its victims.158 In addition to the
physical injuries inherent in the assault itself,159 the emotional
effects are often severe and lifelong.160 Post-rape psychological
and emotional problems include suicidal ideation, sleep
disturbances, phobic responses, eating disorders, helplessness,
dependency, and decreased libido.161 Studies have indicated that
rape victims are thirteen times more likely to develop major
alcohol dependency and abuse problems, and twenty-six times
more likely to develop major drug problems, than are other nonsexual assault victims.162 Rape-induced trauma, sometimes
known as rape-induced post-traumatic stress disorder, also
affects one-third of all rape victims.163 Symptoms of rape-induced
trauma, a chronic psychological condition, include diminished
self-worth, fearfulness, anxiety, sleeplessness, extreme fear,

155
See Corey Rayburn, Better Dead than R(ap)ed?: The Patriarchal Rhetoric
Driving Capital Rape Statutes, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1119, 1138 (2004); Lieb et al.,
supra note 154, at 45–46.
156
Lieb et al., supra note 154, at 48.
157
See infra Part IV.A; see also Beale, supra note 124, at 317 (stating that “[t]he
injury resulting from sex offenses is more serious than that associated with most
other offenses”); Undertaking, supra note 136, at 298.
158
Steven Bennett Weisburd & Brian Levin, “On the Basis of Sex”: Recognizing
Gender-Based Bias Crimes, STAN. L. & POL’Y REV., Spring 1994, at 21, 30.
159
Physical injuries can include, among other things, injury from the rape itself,
injury from any physical assault accompanying the rape, and sexually transmitted
diseases, including HIV/AIDS. Id.
160
See Kathryn M. Carney, Note, Rape: The Paradigmatic Hate Crime, 75 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 315, 344 (2001); Lombardi, supra note 126, at 118.
161
Weisburd & Levin, supra note 158, at 30–31; see also Martha R. Holmes &
Janet S. St. Lawrence, Treatment of Rape-Induced Trauma: Proposed Behavioral
Conceptualization and Review of the Literature, 3 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 417, 419
(1983).
162
Carney, supra note 160, at 345.
163
Id.
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intrusive thoughts, nightmares, and depression.164
Sexual
dysfunctions and impaired relationships are also common
aftereffects of sexual assault.165
Child victims of sex offenses face physical and psychological
consequences all their own. For this vulnerable population, the
trauma caused by the molestation or assault often leads to
feelings of isolation, fear, helplessness and guilt.166 Indeed,
children who are victims of sexual abuse are more likely to
develop post-traumatic stress disorder than are those who are
victim to physical abuse only.167 Moreover, child victims are
more likely to engage in abnormal or unusual sexual behaviors168
and may display violent tendencies and sexual aggression.169 In
one study, up to ninety percent of sex offenders reported that
they themselves were once victims of childhood sexual abuse.170
B.

The Social Costs: Damage to Society, Problems in
Prosecution, and the Importance of Successful and Accurate
Prosecutions

1.

The Effects on Society

Sexual assault and abuse do not just affect the life of the
victim; society also feels their effects. Aside from physical
injuries, sexual assault and rape bring risks of unwanted
pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases.171 Victims often
suffer severe sexual dysfunctions with current and future
intimate partners,172 which may significantly impact the victim’s
own relationship or marriage. All areas of the victim’s social
164

Id.; see also Holmes & St. Lawrence, supra note 161, at 418.
Holmes & St. Lawrence, supra note 161, at 418; see also infra Part IV.B.1.
166
Nathan K. Bays, Comment, A Rush to Punishment: The Louisiana Supreme
Court Upholds the Death Penalty for Child Rape in State v. Kennedy, 82 TUL. L.
REV. 339, 342 (2007).
167
Lieb et al., supra note 154.
168
Id.
169
Bays, supra note 166.
170
Id. at 341–42.
171
Carney, supra note 160. One study showed that approximately 4.7% of adult
women who experienced at least one rape in their lifetimes became pregnant as a
result of rape. Shauna R. Prewitt, Note, Giving Birth to a “Rapist’s Child”: A
Discussion and Analysis of the Limited Legal Protections Afforded to Women Who
Become Mothers Through Rape, 98 Geo. L.J. 827, 828 (2010). Another study found
that approximately fifty percent of women who became pregnant through rape
underwent abortions. Id. at 829.
172
Holmes & St. Lawrence, supra note 161, at 418–20.
165
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functioning, including his or her work, personal interactions, and
marital and familial relationships, are affected after a sexual
assault.173 Furthermore, studies have shown a strong correlation
between child victims of sexual offenses and the tendency for
such victims to show sexual aggression, sometimes resulting in
the victim perpetrating sexual offenses against other children
and adults.174
2.

The Unique Positioning of the Victim and the Tendency To
Underreport

The nature of sexual assault typically dictates that it takes
place secretly and privately, only involving the victim and the
perpetrator and leaving no neutral witnesses.175 Sexual assault
often puts the victim in the unique position of being the only one
who can report the crime. This unique position, however, creates
a new issue in turn: Sexual assault and rape trials become
“unresolvable swearing matches.”176
A “credibility contest
between [the] two parties,”177 the victim must convince
everyone—law enforcement, the prosecution, and ultimately the
jury—that he or she is telling the truth. These credibility issues
are exacerbated in sex crime prosecutions involving child-victims,
where the child may be very young or have difficulty
communicating his or her version of the events.178 Furthermore,
studies have shown that jurors tend to focus on irrelevant
factors, such as the victim’s clothing, lifestyle, and demeanor, in
determining whether the victim was actually sexually
assaulted.179 Studies of jury behavior have shown that jurors
tend to view victims as having brought the sexual assaults on
themselves by consuming alcohol or by wearing seductive
clothing.180

173
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See supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text.
175
See David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense
Cases and Other Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15, 20 (1994); Lombardi, supra note
126, at 117.
176
140 CONG. REC. S12990 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1994).
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Lombardi, supra note 126, at 117.
178
Beale, supra note 124, at 317 & n.35.
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See Aviva Orenstein, Special Issues Raised by Rape Trials, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1585, 1588 (2007); Carney, supra note 160, at 346.
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In addition to the anticipated problems in prevailing over the
perpetrator at trial, centuries of biased requirements in sexual
assault prosecutions have led victims to shy away from reporting
for fear of being victimized a second time at the hands of a biased
law enforcement and legal system.181 Even though many, if not
all, of these biased requirements have been modified or abolished
in modern law, the vestiges of society’s message toward victims
still serve to shape a victim’s perception of how a reported sex
crime will be treated by law enforcement.182 Indeed, “[d]espite
decades of legal reform of the formal law of rape, there has not
been a substantial change in the proportion of victims who are
willing to report having been raped to the police.”183 According to
a 1995 study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, rape is the
violent crime that is least likely to be reported to the police.184
A third but significant problem in reporting is the delay with
which victims decide to report, if they decide to report at all.185
Because friends and acquaintances commit fifty-three percent of
all rapes and sexual assaults,186 there is often a considerable
amount of emotional turmoil which goes into a victim’s decision
of whether or not to report. Aside from the shame experienced by
the victim from the assault itself, there is an added layer of guilt
and grief over whether to disrupt his or her social or familial
network.187 Additionally, self-blame, fear of police refusal or
inability to help, and fear of retaliation from the perpetrator188
may cause victims to be reluctant or afraid to report right
away.189 Unfortunately, this delay in reporting often translates

181
See Michelle J. Anderson, Women Do Not Report the Violence They Suffer:
Violence Against Women and the State Action Doctrine, 46 VILL. L. REV. 907, 927–35
(2001) (explaining the ways in which law enforcement and state and local
prosecutors tend to use a “selection process” in determining whether rape allegations
are valid, whether to investigate the crime, and whether to apprehend the suspect,
depending on factors such as the victim’s own perceived culpability and whether the
case seems winnable); Carney, supra note 160, at 346.
182
See Anderson, supra note 181, at 927.
183
Id. at 937.
184
Ronet Bachman, Is the Glass Half Empty or Half Full?: A Response to
Pollard (1995), 22 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 81, 94 (1995); see also Orenstein, supra
note 179, at 1591 (stating that “rape is wildly underreported”).
185
See Lombardi, supra note 126, at 117.
186
Anderson, supra note 181, at 921.
187
See id. at 922 nn.78–80.
188
Carney, supra note 160, at 344–45.
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Karp, supra note 175, at 20–21.
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into a severe lack of current physical evidence once the assault
has been reported,190 leaving the victim with his or her credibility
alone to convince a jury that the event occurred at all.
3.

Recidivism Rates Among Sexual Perpetrators and Why
Successful Prosecutions Are So Important

Studies have shown that sex offenders tend to be highly
recidivistic.191
Moral inhibitions, along with the threat of
criminal prosecution and incarceration, operate to deter most
members of society from committing sex crimes, even if they do
possess the inclination.192 However, offenders with a history of
committing unwanted sexual acts upon others have
demonstrated that these usual deterrents are not enough to keep
them from resisting their impulses.193 The practical and legal
risks involved in committing crimes do not deter these
offenders,194 and the result is that sex offenders are four times
more likely than any other released prisoner to commit another
sex crime.195 Rapists are 10.5% more likely than other released
prisoners to be arrested for a subsequent rape.196
Studies have also indicated that sex offenders escape
detection twice as often as they are apprehended for their
crimes.197 Indeed, in one study involving convicted rapists (with
an average of three convictions on record) and child molesters
(with an average of two convictions on record), each offender
reported having committed an average of five similar offenses for
which they were never apprehended.198 A significant number of
rapists and child molesters are chronic perpetrators and have
avoided apprehension for dozens and even, in some cases,

190

Lombardi, supra note 126, at 117. Professor Imwinkelried has argued that
the nature of sexual assault and child molestation often makes it more likely that
the perpetrators will leave behind evidence such as DNA, blood, semen, or saliva
which may be used at trial. Undertaking, supra note 136, at 299–300. Unfortunately,
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hundreds of sex crimes.199 Presumably, given the issues with
underreporting and delayed reporting, the lack of viable evidence
in the prosecution of sex crimes, and the tendency of law
enforcement officials and state actors to drop claims of sex
offenses,200 it is relatively easy for sex offenders to stay under the
radar for a significant amount of time before they are finally
convicted for a single offense. In light of these challenges and the
gravity of injury caused by sex offenses, society has a
“correspondingly greater need to prosecute offenders
successfully.”201
C.

The Justifications and Why They Fail To Support the
Application of Spousal Privileges in Sex Crime Prosecutions

Justice Frankfurter once stated that evidentiary privileges
are tolerable “only to the very limited extent that permitting a
refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good
transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all
Although the
rational means for ascertaining truth.”202
utilitarian and marital privacy theories of justification have
traditionally been promulgated in support of the spousal
privileges, the “public good” in promoting marriage and
protecting marital communications cannot possibly “transcend”
society’s interest in securing successful and correct outcomes in
sex crime prosecutions.
1.

The Utilitarian Analysis

a.

The Utilitarian Analysis and the Adverse Testimonial Privilege

The utilitarian approach to preserving the adverse
testimonial privilege does not ultimately support application of
the privileges in prosecutions for sex crimes. The utilitarian
arguments in favor of the adverse testimonial privilege contend
that the societal goals of promoting marriage and preventing a
loyal spouse’s perjury outweigh the need for reliable and
probative evidence.203 However, in order to evaluate whether this
199
Mark R. Weinrott & Maureen Saylor, Self-Report of Crimes Committed by
Sex Offenders, 6 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 286, 286 (1991).
200
See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
201
Beale, supra note 124, at 317.
202
Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
203
See supra Part I.C.
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contention is true with respect to the application of the adverse
testimonial privilege in sex crime prosecutions, two tiers of
analysis are necessary.204 First, one must examine whether the
privilege actually tends to promote the institution of marriage.205
Second, one must evaluate whether there is merit to the
contention that society benefits from promoting the institution of
marriage.206
Many scholars and commentators have challenged the claim
that the adverse testimonial privilege actually prevents marital
discord and promotes marriage.207
Professor Wigmore has
argued that, in light of the many factors which influence the
marital relationship, the danger of discord arising as a result of
one spouse testifying against the other is only a casual and minor
one.208 Given the small percentage of marriages that even
encounter a situation where one spouse may testify against the
other, it would seem a stretch at best to say that the existence of
the adverse testimonial privilege has a marked effect on the
institution of marriage. As one scholar noted, “[t]he degree to
which privileges promote family harmony and confidentiality is
speculative, while the damage of lost evidence, though difficult to
assess precisely, is certain.”209
The argument that society as a whole benefits from
promoting legal—and, by extension, often solely heterosexual—
marriage may be similarly misguided.210 The institution of
“heterosexual, monogamous marriage” has been traditionally
viewed as the “preeminent intimate relationship in Western
society.”211 However, as individuals “perceive themselves with
more control than before” over decisions regarding sexuality,
procreation, marriage, and divorce,212 the modern relationship
has evolved into a different institution than that which the
spousal privileges originally were designed to support. As one
scholar noted, if spousal privileges are designed to protect family
intimacy, their “exclusive focus on legal marriage is
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212

Developments in the Law, supra note 49, at 1578.
Id.
Id.
Id.
WIGMORE, supra note 54, § 2332.
Developments in the Law, supra note 49, at 1581.
Id. at 1582.
Id. at 1581.
Regan, supra note 67, at 2074.
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inappropriate.”213 Because other intimate relationships, such as
parents and children, cohabiting partners, and homosexual
couples, are not afforded the luxury of spousal privileges,214 it
seems a dubious contention that it benefits society at large to
continue protecting certain intimate relationships and not others.
As notions of family and intimacy evolve, blind deference to the
traditional institution of marriage wholly ignores other accepted
and ordinary forms of loving commitment. Indeed, as one scholar
commented, “[m]any other relationships are also intimate and
loving, and many traditional marriages are marked by violence
and domination.”215 If the goal of the adverse testimonial
privilege is to foster marital harmony for the benefit of family
and children, its limitation to one form of intimate relationship in
this day and age is inconsistent with that stated goal. Should
public perception of the legal system be a concern at all, the
explicit protection of only legal, heterosexual marriage arguably
could further public distrust, in that non-traditional families
denied the privilege’s protection may be subject to very different
legal outcomes than might other, more traditional families.
While the sacred nature of the marital union has long been
revered, pure deference to the institution seems a shaky
foundation for the continued application of the adverse
testimonial privilege, at least where it operates to exclude
reliable, probative, and often crucial evidence of sexual offenses.
b.

The Utilitarian Analysis and the Spousal Communications
Privilege

The utilitarian analysis similarly fails in supporting the
application of the spousal communications privilege in sex crime
prosecutions. Because the spousal communications privilege
specifically concerns communications made in confidentiality
between the defendant-spouse and the witness-spouse, it is
subject to Professor Wigmore’s four-factor analysis. While the
privilege arguably satisfies the first factor, it may not satisfy the
second and third, and certainly must fail the last.

213
214
215

Developments in the Law, supra note 49, at 1582.
See Glover, supra note 37, at 752–53.
Developments in the Law, supra note 49, at 1582 (footnote omitted).
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To satisfy the four-prong test, Professor Wigmore first
requires that the communication be based on a confidence that
the communications in question will not be disclosed to others.216
This prong is contingent on the circumstances of the disclosure
itself and is reflected in the general rules, in that the
communication must be made without the presence of a third
party and without the understanding that the communication
will or could be disclosed to a third party.217 Because it is likely
that a sex offender who makes incriminating remarks to his or
spouse expects that disclosure to remain confidential, this Note
will assume that this first factor is satisfied.
The second requirement of Wigmore’s balancing test
mandates that the confidentiality of communications between the
parties is “essential” to the maintenance of the relationship.218
The argument that the protection of confidentiality between the
parties is essential to the marital relationship necessarily implies
that the general public is even aware that legal privileges protect
their communications.219 On the contrary, it is widely believed
that, aside from lawyers, “virtually no one is aware of the
existence of the marital privileges.”220 Spousal intimacy is “so
great” and the need for communication is typically “so
compelling” that it is difficult to imagine that the absence of a
spousal privilege would serve to chill marital communications.221
In contrast, the legal protection of confidentiality as to
disclosures made in the context of a professionally privileged
relationship—that is, communications made between a penitent
and a clergyperson, a patient and a psychotherapist, or a client
and an attorney—is absolutely essential in order for these
disclosures to even occur.222 Whereas it is quite believable that a
client may hesitate or completely refuse to disclose sensitive
information to his or her attorney without the utmost legal
protections against that disclosure being used against him at
trial, it is much less believable that a spouse would contemplate
216
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219
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evidentiary privileges—or lack thereof—in choosing to disclose
sensitive information to his or her spouse.223 Indeed, Professor
McCormick, the author of a noted treatise on evidence, has stated
that “while the danger of injustice from suppression of relevant
proof is clear and certain, the probable benefits of the rule of
privilege in encouraging marital confidences and wedded
harmony are marginal.”224
Thirdly, Professor Wigmore requires that the relationship
protected is one which must be “sedulously fostered.”225
However, it is unclear whether it is appropriate for society to
place such importance on the legal marital relationship in light of
the changing nature of intimate relationships.226 Furthermore,
while at least part of the motivation behind promoting candor
between spouses relates to promoting healthy environments for
raising children, marriage is no longer the only context in which
children are typically raised.227 As traditional notions of family
change,228 so do parental circumstances, and such circumstances
may or may not involve legal marriage. It is at least debatable
whether the traditional idea of marriage is something the legal
system is charged with “sedulously fostering.”
However tenuous the satisfaction of Professor Wigmore’s
first three utilitarian factors by the spousal communications
privilege, the utilitarian justification must ultimately fail upon
consideration of the fourth balancing factor. Professor Wigmore
suggested that a court should only recognize a privilege when the
injury caused to the relationship in question by the disclosure of
the communications is greater than the benefit gained by the
admission of such evidence at trial.229 This fourth factor of
analysis gets to the heart of the cost-benefit calculation, and
within this analysis the overwhelming interests in the correct
resolution of litigation230 in sex crime prosecutions are at their
most salient. Sexual offenses are widely considered to be one of
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the most heinous categories of crime committed against a person,
and result in profound harm to the victims.231 Their effects are
felt throughout society and may even increase the number of
Sex crimes are woefully
future sexual predators.232
underreported, and such reports, if made at all, may be so
delayed out of fear, shame, or trauma that crucial evidence is
often already lost by the time the victim comes forward.233 Given
such difficulties in prosecution, it is relatively easy for sex
offenders and abusers to escape detection, with perpetrators
often offending against multiple victims by the time
apprehension does occur.234
Such policy interests are
overwhelming and certainly outweigh society’s interests in
providing debatable protection to marital intimacy.
2.

The Marital Privacy Justification

The marital privacy justification, similar to the utilitarian
arguments, ultimately fails to support application of the spousal
privileges in federal sex crime prosecutions. Despite some
commentators’ claims that there is a constitutional realm of
privacy, emanating from the Griswold v. Connecticut235 decision
and extending to the marital relationship, courts have repeatedly
stated that family privileges are not constitutionally rooted.236 If
the spousal communications privilege were rooted in familial
privacy, it would presumably apply throughout each family
relationship, including sibling-sibling, parent-child, and parentparent.237 The familial or marital privacy rationale similarly
cannot support the adverse testimonial privilege, as the privilege
would be both under-inclusive, in that it applies to adverse, and
not neutral, testimony, and over-inclusive, in that it applies to
non-confidential testimony as well as confidential testimony, in
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its fulfillment of such an aim.238 Moreover, the Supreme Court’s
decision in Trammel noticeably did not take marital privacy into
account when it allowed the adverse testimonial privilege to be
waived by the witness-spouse over the objections of the
defendant-spouse.239 Had the Court intended marital privacy to
be a consideration, surely it would have considered the detriment
caused to such privacy by allowing one spouse to reveal
potentially incriminating facts he or she learned by virtue of the
intimate marital relationship.
Whatever the normative value of privacy may be, it still
must be weighed against other, competing societal interests.240
Protecting marital privacy in the realm of evidentiary law
necessarily means lost information. As one commentator noted,
“[t]he more private the information, the less likely it can be
obtained from a source outside the spouse, and therefore the
greater the harm to the legal process if it is protected by a
privilege.”241 Once again, the balancing aspect of Professor
Wigmore’s utilitarian analysis becomes important, as the
competing interests in marital privacy must weigh against
society’s interest in obtaining information crucial to a criminal
prosecution, which may not be found anywhere else.
Significantly, feminist critics have attacked the marital
privacy rationale for an entirely different but equally relevant
reason.242 These critics have argued that the traditional notion of
familial privacy frequently was used to justify isolation of the
family from state interference and was instrumental in
“perpetuating traditional gender hierarchies and power
imbalances.”243 These notions long insulated women from the
legal system, sending a powerful message that women “[were]
not important enough to merit legal regulation.”244 Similar to the
historical tendency for law enforcement to re-victimize victims of
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sexual assault, and the lasting effect that re-victimization has
had on underreporting, there is a danger that allowing “marital
privacy” concerns to prevail over sexual assault victims’ safety
could perpetuate women’s mistrust of the legal system.
CONCLUSION
While the spousal privileges have enjoyed a long and deeply
rooted place in American jurisprudence, it cannot be denied that
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 has bestowed upon the federal
courts the ability to use their “reason and experience” to shape
evidentiary privileges. This ability reflects an acknowledgement
that as cultural and societal norms change, public policy
interests may shift, ultimately rendering some privileges
inapplicable or inappropriate in various situations. Sex crimes
inflict some of the worst and most traumatic effects upon their
victims among all violent crimes and indeed bear with them a
unique repugnance and reprehensibility. Such crimes pose grave
risks to society and, as such, it is extremely important that sex
crime prosecutions are resolved successfully and accurately.
However, for a variety of reasons, these prosecutions bring
significant hurdles for prosecutors to overcome. In light of
Congress’s explicit recognition of these facts through its passage
of Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414, and 415, it is important
that the legal community take a serious and focused look at
spousal privileges in order to determine whether these ancient
impediments to the truth-seeking function of the courts are
warranted any longer in sex crime prosecutions. As federal
courts struggle with whether and how to broaden the scope of the
spousal crime exception, this Note urges those courts to turn
their focus away from factors such as the victim’s age and the
relationship between the defendant and the victim and instead
look to the crime alleged. In the face of the strong public policy
interests in favor of successfully resolving sex crime prosecutions,
the traditionally-cited justifications underlying the spousal
privileges cannot support their continued application, and
therefore a ripe opportunity exists to carve a new exception to the
spousal privileges in federal sex crime prosecutions.

